In PKC 2010, Matsuda, Nishimaki and Tanaka proposed a bidirectional proxy reencryption (PRE) scheme without bilinear maps, and claimed that their scheme is chosenciphertext secure in the standard model. However, by giving a concrete attack, in this paper we indicate that their PRE scheme fails to achieve the chosen-ciphertext security. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the fact that, it is still an open problem to come up with a chosen-ciphertext secure PRE scheme without bilinear maps in the standard model.
Introduction
Proxy re-encryption (PRE), introduced by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [3] in Eurocrypt'98, allows a semi-trust proxy to translate a ciphertext intended for Alice into another ciphertext intended for Bob. The proxy, however, can not learn anything about the underlying messages. According to the direction of transformation, PRE can be categorized into bidirectional PRE, in which the proxy can transform from Alice to Bob and vice versa, and unidirectional PRE, in which the proxy cannot transform ciphertexts in the opposite direction. PRE can also be categorized into multi-hop PRE, in which the ciphertexts can be transformed from Alice to Bob and then to Charlie and so on, and single-hop PRE, in which the ciphertexts can only be transformed once.
In their seminal paper, Blaze et al. [3] proposed the first bidirectional PRE scheme. Ateniese et al. [1, 2] presented unidirectional PRE schemes from bilinear maps. All of these schemes are only secure against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA). However, applications often require security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA).
To fill this gap, Canetti and Hohenberger [6] presented the first CCA-secure bidirectional multi-hop PRE scheme in the standard model. Libert and Vergnaud [10, 11] proposed a unidirectional single-hop PRE scheme, which is replayable CCA-secure [7] in the standard model. Recently, Weng et al. [14] presented a unidirectional single-hop PRE scheme, which is CCA-secure against adaptive corruption of users in the standard model. The above schemes rely on bilinear maps. In spite of the recent advances in implementation technique, compared with standard operations such as modular exponentiation in finite fields, the bilinear map computation is still considered as a rather expensive operation. It would be desirable for cryptosystems to be constructed without relying on pairings, especially in computation resource limited settings. Thus, how to construct a CCA-secure PRE scheme without bilinear maps is left as an open problem in [6] .
Deng et al. [9] presented a bidirectional single-hop PRE scheme without bilinear maps, and proved its CCA-security in the random oracle model. Shao and Cao presented a unidirectional single-hop PRE scheme without bilinear maps, and claimed that their scheme is CCA-secure in the random oracle model. However, Sherman, Weng and Yang et al. [8] present a concrete attack, and indicated that Shao and Cao's PRE scheme is not CCAsecure. They further presented a CCA-secure unidirectional single-hop PRE scheme without bilinear maps, again in the random oracle model. It is well-known [4, 5] that a proof in the random oracle model can only serve as an argument, which does not imply the security for real implementations. Thus, it is more desirable to come up with a CCA-secure PRE scheme without bilinear maps in the standard model.
In PKC 2010, Matsuda, Nishimaki and Tanaka proposed a bidirectional multi-hop proxy re-encryption (PRE) scheme without bilinear maps, and claimed that their scheme is CCAsecure in the standard model. However, in this paper, we present a concrete attack, and indicate that their PRE scheme fails to achieve the CCA-security. Thus it is still an open problem to come up with a CCA-secure PRE scheme without bilinear maps in the standard model.
Preliminaries
Matsuda-Nishimaki-Tanaka PRE scheme involves the primitives of all-but-one trapdoor function and re-applicable (n, k) lossy trapdoor functions (LTDFs). Thus in this section, we shall review the definitions of these two primitives (for more details, the reader is referred to [12] and [13] ). We shall also review the definition and security notion for bidirectional multi-hop PRE.
All-But-One Trapdoor Function
Let B = {B λ } λ∈N be a collection of sets whose elements represents the branches. A collection of (n, k)-all-but-one trapdoor functions is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms (G abo , F abo , F −1 abo ) having the following properties:
• All-but-one property: Given a lossy branch b * ∈ B λ , the algorithm G abo ( 
Statistical indistinguishability of the fake key: The algorithm FakeKey(s
, where s i is the first element of an output from LossyGen(τ i ). Let X λ denote the distribution of (par, s i , s j , s i↔j , τ i , τ j ), and let Y λ denote the distribution of (par,
, where each par, s j , s i↔j , and τ j has the same meaning as that in the above paragraph. Then, {X λ } and {Y λ } are statistically indistinguishable.
Generation of injective functions from lossy functions:
Let s be the first element of an output from FakeKey(s los , τ ), where τ is a tag and s los is the first element of an output from LossyGen(τ los ). Then, for every τ , LossyEval(s, ·) represents an injective function f s,⋆ with overwhelming probability, where a random variable is the randomness of FakeKey(s los , τ 
Realization of Re-applicable LTDFs
Based on Peikert and Waters' LTDFs [13] , Matsuda, Nishimaki and Tanaka [12] gave a realization of re-applicable LTDFs, which is specified as below (for more details, the reader is referred to [12] ):
ParGen: This algorithm first generates a cyclic group G with prime order p, and then chooses a random generator g ∈ G. Next, it selects random numbers r 1 , · · · , r n ∈ R Z p , and outputs the public parameters C 1 as
LossyGen: Taking as input the public parameter C 1 and a tag τ ∈ G (note that if τ is the identity element e of G, it means execution of the lossy mode; otherwise, execution of the injective mode), this algorithm first selects random elements z 1 , z 2 , · · · , z n ∈ R Z p , and then computes a function index as
Finally, it outputs the function index s = (C 1 , C 2 ) and the trapdoor td = z = (z 1 , · · · , z n ).
LossyEval: Taking as input a function index s = (C 1 , C 2 ) and an n-bit input x = (x 1 , · · · , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n , this algorithm outputs (y 1 , y 2 ) such that
.
LossyInv: Taking as input (td, τ, (y 1 , y 2 )), where the trapdoor information td consists of z = (z 1 , · · · , z n ), the tag τ is an element in G\{e}, and
). Then, if j-th element of w is the identity element of G, then it sets x j = 0; else if the j-th element of w is τ then it sets x j = 1; otherwise, it outputs ⊥. Finally, it outputs x = (x 1 , · · · , x n ).
ReIndex: Taking as input trapdoors td
). Then it outputs (y 1 , y ′ 2 ). PrivReEval: Taking as input x, τ i , τ j and s j , where x = (x 1 , · · · , x n ) is n-bit input, this algorithm first computes (ŷ 1 ,ŷ 2 ) ← LossyEval(s j , x). Next, it makesŷ ′ 2 fromŷ 2 in the following process: for each i ∈ [1, n] , 
FakeKey: Taking as input a function index s i = (C 1 , C 2 ) and a tag τ i ∈ G, this algorithm first chooses a random element t ∈ G. Next, it chooses random numbers
Then it makes a new matrix C ′ 2 as follows:
where c k is the k entry of C 1 , and c k,ℓ is the (k, ℓ) entry of C 2 . Finally, it outputs
Bidirectional Multi-Hop PRE
A bidirectional PRE scheme Π = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, ReKeyGen, ReEnc, Dec) consists of the following six algorithms:
• Setup(1 λ ): Given a security parameter 1 λ , this setup algorithm outputs a public parameter P P . Denote this by P P ← Setup(1 λ ).
• KeyGen(P P ): Given the public parameter P P , this key generation algorithm outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk. Denote this by (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(P P ).
• Enc(P P, pk, m): Given the public parameter P P , a public key pk and a message m in the message space M, this encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext C. Denote this by C ← Enc(P P, pk, m).
• ReKeyGen(P P, sk i , sk j ): Given the public parameter P P , a pair of secret keys sk i and sk j where i ̸ = j, this re-encryption key generation algorithm outputs a re-encryption key rk i↔j . Denote this by rk i↔j ← ReKeyGen(P P, sk i , sk j ).
• ReEnc(P P, rk i↔j , C i ): Given the public parameter P P , a re-encryption key rk i↔j and a ciphertext C i intended for user i, this re-encryption algorithm outputs another ciphertext C j for user j or the error symbol ⊥. Denote this by C j ← ReEnc(P P, rk i↔j , C i ).
• Dec(P P, sk, C): Given the public parameter P P , a public key sk and a ciphertext C, this decryption algorithm outputs a message m or the error symbol ⊥.
Next, we review the definition of chosen-ciphertext security for bidirectional multi-hop PRE scheme as defined in [6, 12] . Let λ be the security parameter, A be an oracle TM, representing the adversary, and Γ U and Γ C be two lists which are initially empty. The game consists of an execution of A with the following oracles, which can be invoked multiple times in any order, subject to the constraints specified as below:
Setup Oracle: This oracle can be queried first in the game only once. This oracle generates the public parameters P P ← Setup(1 λ ), and gives P P to A.
Uncorrupted key generation:
This oracle first generates a new key pair by running (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(P P ). Next, it adds pk in Γ U , and gives pk to A.
Corrupted key generation:
This oracle generates a new key pair by running (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(P P ). Next, it adds pk in Γ C , and gives (pk, sk) to A.
Challenge oracle: This oracle can be queried only once. On input (pk i * , m 0 , m 1 ), this oracle randomly chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and gives C i * = Enc(P P, pk i * , m b ) to A. Here it is required that pk i * ∈ Γ U . We call pk i * the challenge key and C i * the challenge ciphertext.
Re-encryption key generation: On input (pk i , pk j ) from the adversary, this oracle gives the re-encryption key rk i↔j = ReKeyGen(P P, sk i , sk j ) to A, where sk i and sk j are the secret keys corresponding to pk i and pk j , respectively. Here it is required that pk i and pk j are both in Γ C , or alternatively are both in Γ U .
Re-encryption oracle:
On input (pk i , pk j , C i ), if pk j ∈ Γ C and (pk i , C i ) is a derivative of (pk i * , C i * ), this oracle give A a special symbol ⊥, which is not in the domain of messages or ciphertext. Otherwise, it gives the re-encrypted ciphertext C j = ReEnc(P P, ReKeyGen(P P, sk i , sk j ), C i ) to A. Derivatives of (pk i * , C i * ) are defined inductively as follows:
• (pk i * , C i * ) is a derivative of itself.
• If (pk, C) is a derivative of (pk i * , C i * ), and (pk ′ , C ′ ) is a derivative of (pk, C), then (pk ′ , C ′ ) is a derivative of (pk i * , C i * ).
• If A has queried the re-encryption oracle on input (pk, pk ′ , C) and obtained the response C ′ , then (pk ′ , C ′ ) is a derivative of (pk, C).
• If A has queried the re-encryption key generation oracle on input (pk, pk ′ ) or (pk ′ , pk), and C ′ = ReEnc(P P, ReKeyGen(P P, sk, sk ′ ), C), then (pk ′ , C ′ ) is a deriva-tive of (pk, C), where sk and sk ′ are the secret keys corresponding to pk and pk ′ , respectively.
Decryption oracle:
On input (pk, C), if the pair (pk, C) is a derivative of the challenge key and ciphertext (pk i * , C i * ), or pk is not in Γ U ∪ Γ C , this oracle returns the special symbol ⊥ to A. Otherwise, it returns the result of Dec(P P, sk, C) to A, where sk is the secret key with respect to pk.
Decision oracle:
This oracle can be queried at the end of the game. On input b ′ , if b ′ = b and the challenge key pk i * ∈ Γ U , this algorithm output 1; else output 0.
We describe the output of the decision oracle in the above game as Expt bid-PRE-CCA Π,A (λ) = b for an adversary A and a scheme Π. We define the advantage of adversary A as
where the probability is over the random choices of A and oracles. We say that the scheme Π is secure under the bidirectional PRE-CCA attack, if for any PPT adversary A, his advantage Adv
(λ) is negligible in the security parameter λ (for sufficiently large λ).
Review of Matsuda-Nishimaki-Tanaka PRE Scheme
In this section, we shall review Matsuda-Nishimaki-Tanaka bidirectional multi-hop PRE Scheme. Let λ be the security parameter, and let n, k, k ′ , k ′′ and v be parameters depended on λ. Let (SigGen, SigSign, SigVer) be a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme where the verification keys are in {0, 1} v . Let (ParGen, LossyGen, LossyEval, LossyInv, ReEval, PrivReEval, Trans, FakeKey) be a collection of re-applicable (n, k)-LTDFs and T be a set of tags. Let (G abo , F abo , F −1 abo ) be a collection of (n, k ′ )-ABO trapdoor functions with branches B λ = {0, 1} v , which contains the set of signature verification keys. Let H be a family of pairwise independent hash functions from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} k ′′ . It is required that the above parameters satisfy (k + k ′ ) − (k ′′ + n) ≥ δ = δ 1 + δ 2 for some δ 1 = ω(log λ) and δ 2 = ω(log λ). The message space of the system is {0, 1} k ′′ . The Matsuda-Nishimaki-Tanaka PRE scheme [12] is specified by the following algorithms: Setup(1 λ ): This algrithm first generates an index of all-but-one trapdoor functions with lossy branch 0 v : (s abo , td abo ) ← G abo (1 λ , 0 v ). Then, it generates a public parameter of re-applicable LTDFs: par ← ParGen(1 λ ). Next, it chooses a hash function h from H. Finally, it outputs a public parameter as P P = (s abo , par, h). Note that the algorithm Setup erases the trapdoor td abo because the following algorithms do not use td abo .
KeyGen(P P ): Taking as input the pubic parameters P P = (s abo , par, h), this algorithm first chooses a tag τ ∈ T \{τ los } and generates an injective index of re-applicable LTDFs: (s rltdf , td rltdf ) ← LossyGen(τ ). Finally, it outputs the public key pk = (s rltdf , τ ) and the secret key sk = (td rltdf , s rltdf , τ ).
Enc(P P, pk, m):
Taking as input the public parameters P P = (s abo , par, h), public key pk = (s rltdf , τ ) and a message m ∈ {0, 1} k ′′ , this encryption algorithm first chooses x ∈ {0, 1} n uniformly at random. Next it generates a key-pair for the one-time signature scheme: (vk, sk σ ) ← SigGen(1 λ ), and computes
Then it signs a tuple (c 2 , c 3 , τ ) as σ ← SigSign(sk σ , (c2, c3, τ )). Finally, it outputs the ciphertext C = (vk, c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , τ, σ). 
ReKeyGen(P

Attack
In this section, we shall present a concrete CCA-attack against Matsuda-Nishimaki-Tanaka PRE scheme. Before presenting the attack, we would like mention a fundamental principle for designing CCA-secure PRE schemes, i.e., the validity of all the ciphertext components in the original ciphertext should be able to be verified by the proxy. Unfortunately, Matsuda-Nishimaki-Tanaka PRE scheme violates this principle. Indeed, for a ciphertext
, the validity of vk, c 2 , c 3 , τ and σ can be ensured by checking whether SigVer(vk, (c 2 , c 3 , τ ′ ), σ) = 1 holds 1 . However, it is impossible for the proxy to verify the validity of component c 1,i : observe that in the encryption algorithm, component c 1,i is not included in the generation of the one-time signature, and it will be transformed into c 1,j in the re-encryption algorithm. Thus, Matsuda-Nishimaki-Tanaka PRE scheme inevitably suffers from a chosen-ciphertext attack. Roughly speaking, an adversary can break the CCA-security of Matsuda-NishimakiTanaka PRE scheme as follows: Given the challenge ciphertext C i * = (vk, c 1,i  *  , c 2 , c 3 , τ, σ) , the adversary can first modify the ciphertext component c 1,i * to obtain a new (ill-formed) ciphertext C ′ i * and then ask the re-encryption oracle to re-encrypt C ′ i * into another ciphertext C ′ j for a corrupted user j (note that according to the security model, it is legal for the adversary to issue such a query); next, the adversary can modify C ′ j to obtain the right reencrypted ciphertext C j of the challenge ciphertext, and thus he can obtain the underlying plaintext by decrypting C j with user j's secret key.
Below we give the attack details. For an easy explanation of how the adversary can modify C ′ j to obtain the right transformed ciphertext C j , when describing the underlying reapplicable LTDFs we shall take Matsuda-Nishimaki-Tanaka's concrete realization (recalled in Section 2.3) as the example. Concretely, the adversary works as follows:
1. The adversary first obtains the public parameters P P from the setup oracle.
2. The adversary obtains a public key pk i * from the uncorrupted key generation oracle.
Note that pk i * will be added in Γ U by the oracle.
3. The adversary obtains a public/secret key pair (pk j , sk j ) from the corrupted key generation oracle. Note that pk j will be added in Γ C by the oracle. (ỹ 2,1 , · · · ,ỹ 2,n )). Then, the aversary submits (pk i * , pk j , C ′ i * ) to the reencryption oracle. Note that, although pk j ∈ Γ C , it is legal for the adversary to issue this query, since (pk i * , C ′ i * ) is not a derivate of (pk i * , C i * ). Note that, the re-encryption algorithm ReEnc cannot check the validity of the ciphertext component c ′ 1,i * . So, the re-encryption oracle will return the re-encrypted ciphertext C ′ j = ReEnc(P P, ReKeyGen(P P, sk i * , sk j ), C ′ i * ) to the adversary. According to the re-encryption algorithm, we have ) .
Observe that c 1,j is indeed equivalent to the result of ReEval(s i * ↔j , c 1,i * ). Thus, C j = (vk * , c 1,j , c * 2 , c * 3 , τ * , σ * ) is indeed the result of ReEnc(P P, ReKeyGen(P P, sk i * , sk j ), C i * ), which is an encryption of m b . Now, the adversary can obtain the underlying plaintext m b by decrypting the re-encrypted ciphertext C j using the secret key sk j , and obviously can break the CCA-security of Matsuda-Nishimaki-Tanaka PRE scheme.
The above attack can also be simply extended to the case that the user j is uncorrupted. In this case, the adversary A directly request (pk j , C j ) to the decryption oracle, which will return the plaintext m b to A.
